Some Unusual Aspects of Mental Irresponsibility in the Criminal Law by Woodbridge, Frederick
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 29
Issue 6 March-April Article 4
Spring 1939
Some Unusual Aspects of Mental Irresponsibility in
the Criminal Law
Frederick Woodbridge
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Frederick Woodbridge, Some Unusual Aspects of Mental Irresponsibility in the Criminal Law, 29 Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology
822 (1938-1939)
SOME UNUSUAL ASPECTS OF MENTAL IRRE-
SPONSIBILITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW*
FREDERICK WOODBRIDGEt
If a doctor were to bleed his patients with leeches today, or if
a psychiatrist were to attribute insanity to the moon, the hue and
cry would be tremendous. And yet instance after instance may be
pointed out wherein the law has remained, sometimes for hun-
dreds of years, curiously rigid, despite the changes in scientific
opinion upon which that law was based. Many rules in the criminal
law are still affected by early views concerning psychology, which
views are now outmoded or repudiated by newer discoveries through
experimentation. A large number fail utterly to take cognizance of
advances in education and educational methods.
Illustrative of this inconsistency is the treatment of mental
inferiors, of deaf-mutes, and somnambulists before the bar. It is
the purpose of this article to trace the rules relating to. criminal
irresponsibility of these unfortunates as they are affected by or
diverge from advances made in the various other fields relating to
human conduct. There are comparatively few reported cases
concerning the second and third classes' mentioned above. Cases
concerning the first class are common but usually considered under
the general heading of insanity.
I. Idiocy and Imbecility
The term "insanity" might well be called a word with a chang-
ing content, varying in color or meaning according to the circum-
stances in which it is used. It would not serve here any useful
purpose to trace the development of that term down through
history. It has already been done in more detail than the limits
of propriety here permit. 2 For our purposes, however, it should
* This paper was prepared while the writer was a Research Fellow at the
Harvard Law School (1937-38) as a portion of a research project under Professor
Sheldon Glueck.
t Instructor in Law, University of Cincinnati; absent on leave as a Teaching
Fellow, University of Michigan Law School 1938-39.
1 In 1931 it was estimated that there were about 53,000 deaf-mutes in the
United States. 5 Ency. of the Social Sciences 19 (1931).
2S. Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law (1925) 123 et seq.; Cook,
Insanity and Mental Deficiency in Relation to Legal Responsibility (1921) 1 et seq.
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be noted that the term non sane memorie was originally used to
describe those suffering from unsound mind, from whatever cause.
Littleton used the term non compos mentis as explaining the true
sense of the ailment much better than non sane memorie.3 Coke
used the term in a generic sense to include all persons of unsound
mind, subsuming under that heading four types of persons, among
whom were: 1. An idiot who had no understanding from birth.
2. One who once had understanding but because of some cause
had wholly lost it. 3. A lunatic who was sometimes of understand-
ing and sometimes not.4 Dalton5 and Hale6 maintained the distinc-
tions between idiot and lunatic, the first being a "fdole naturalle,"
the second, one suffering from some disease. Indeed the term
"lunacy" means, as Hale pointed out, some affectation caused by the
moon.7  This distinction between mental defect or amentia and
mental disease or dementia probably came from the Roman Law,8
and in the English law it affected the right of the Crown, as a
natural guardian, to take the goods and chattels of idiots.' Our
courts have not always made a distinction between amentia and
dementia, and as a result they have been forced into some difficult
positions as will later appear.
For present purposes we are interested only in mental defect
and the legal effect of it in criminal cases.' The term is used in a
generic sense. Under it were originally made the subdivisions
of idiocy and imbecility. The courts are not agreed upon the
meaning of the term "'idot" using it in several senses. Complete
ignorance was a mark of idiocy according to Fitzherbert' 0 who
said that an idiot was one who could not number twenty pence,
nor tell who his father or mother were, nor how old he-was. This,
however, is not a test for idiocy in the criminal law, but is rather
a factor to be considered in determining idiocy." Fitzherbert used
3 Coke, Littleton f. 247.
4 Ibid.
5 Dalton, The Country Justice (ed. 1643) Cap. 95.
6 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown (folio ed. 1736) 29 et seq.
7 Compare the statement of Hale where he considered accidental dementia
of a partial nature: ". . . the latter (partial dementia) is that, which is usually
call'd *lunacy, for the moon hath a great influence in all diseases of the brain,
especially in this kind of dementia; such persons commonly in the full and
change of the moon, especially about the equinoxes and summer solstice, are
usually in the height of their distemper." 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown (folio ed.
1736) 31.
8Ray, Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity (4th ed. 1860) 4, 5.
O Fitzherbert, New Natura Brevium (ed. 1652) 581, 583.
20 Ibid.
II 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown (folio ed. 1736) 29. "These though they may
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this illustration mentioned above in connection with his explanation
of the writ de idiota inquirendo.12 At common law an idiot was
not responsible criminally for his acts. 3
The term "imbecility" does not appear in the earliest cases.
Only those who were demented and those* who were idiots were
excused from criminal responsibility because of mental disorder.
One court stated recently that the term "imbecile" has no fixed
meaning in the law.14
Both these terms are used in statutes of various types. They
do not appear to be defined by many legislatures, however, and
the courts are in great confusion on the matter."1 This confusion is
increased by the use of expert medical testimony on the question of
menial disorder, because the medical profession does make a dis-
tinction between the insane, whom they consider demented, and
those suffering from mental defect or weak-mindedness. 16 Hence, it
sometimes happens that when an expert comes to the witness stand
to testify, he is unable to do anything for a feeble-minded defendant
because he cannot testify that the latter is "insane" in the sense that
he is suffering from some disease which affects his mental ability to
discern right from wrong, or, if he is in a more liberal jurisdiction,
his volitional control. 17
Feeble-mindedness as a generic term is applied today by psy-
chologists in this country to all persons of weak mentality. This
term is divided into three subdivisions: 1. Idiot. 2. Imbecile.
3. Moron. Prior to 1910 there was no authoritative definition here
of each of these terms, and it is clear that the courts did not, and
indeed still do not, use them with any degree of consistency.18 In
England the term "feeble-mindedness" has been reserved for the
highest group which we term moronic.19 In 1910 the American
be evidence, yet they are too narrow, and conclude not always; for ideocy or not
is a question of fact triable by jury, and sometimes by inspection."
12 Supra note 9.
13 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown (folio ed. 1736) 29.
14 State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt. 450, 108 Atl. 391 (1919).
1Infra note 34.
16 Maudsley, Responsibility in Mental Diseases (3d ed. 1876) Chap. III, p. 66;
Cook, Insanity and Mental Deficiency in Relation to Legal Responsibility (1921)
1 et seq.; Goddard, The Criminal Imbecile (1915) 1 et seq.
17 State v. Tapie, 173 La. 780, 138 So. 665 (1931); State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt. 480,
108 Atl. 391 (1919). Semble, State v. Schlaps, 78 Mont. 560, 254 Pac. 858 (1927).
Cf. People v. Oxnam, 170 Cal. 211, 149 Pac. 165 (1915); People v. Norton, 138 Cal.
App. 70, 31 P. (2d) 809 (1934); People v. Kimball, 55 P. (2d) 483 (Cal. 1936);
Christwell v. State, 171 Ark. 255, 283 S. W. 981 (1926).
18 12 Ency. Brittanica (14th ed. 1929) 387; Cook, Insanity and Mental Deficiency
in Relation to Legal Responsibility (1921) 11 et seq.
193 & 4 Geo. V, c. 28 (1913).
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Association for the Study of Feeble-mindedness, which is the author-
itative body on that subject in the United States, adopted a defini-
tion for these terms. It provided:
"REsOLVED: 1. That the term, feeble-minded, be used generically
to include all degrees of mental defect due to arrested or imperfect
mental development as a result of which the person so affected is in-
capable of competing on equal terms with his normal fellows or man-
aging himself or his affairs with ordinary prudence. 2. That the feeble-
minded be divided into three classes, viz.: Idiots-Those so deeply
defective that their mental development never exceeds that of a normal
child of about two years. Imbeciles- Those whose mental development
is above that of an idiot but does not exceed that of a normal child
of about seven years. Morons-Those whose mental "development is
above that of an imbecile but does not exceed that of a normal child
of about twelve years."20
These terms are defined by statute in England and it is inter-
esting to note that the definitions are based upon social consider-
ations. An idiot is one "so deeply defective from birth or an
early age as to be unable to guard against common physical dan-
gers." Imbeciles are those whose mental defectiveness exists from
birth or an early age not amounting fo idiocy but which is so pro-
nounced that they cannot manage their own affairs, or, if children,
that they cannot be taught to do so. Feeble-minded persons, the
next step in the ascending scale, are those who are mentally de-
fective, but not imbeciles, yet who are, becauses of the mental
defect, in need of supervision either for their own good or for
the protection of the public, or in the case of children, those who
are permanently incapable of receiving proper benefit from instruc-
tion in ordinary schools.2 This statute deals with administration,
but provides also for the proper care of criminals suffering from
these types of mental defect so that conceivably it could be applied
in the criminal law. As England does not, by statute, make idiocy
or imbecility a defense to criminal responsibility, the problem does
not arise there that is present in some states in this country.
Many jurisdictions in this country have provided, by statute,
exemptions from criminal responsibility in favor of certain per-
sons.-2 While they differ in their wording, the statutes provide in
20 9 Ency. Brittanica (14th ed. 1929) 140.
21 Supra note 19.
22 Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) §4489; Digest of the Stats. of Ark. (1937) §§2924, 2928;
Cal. Penal Code (1935) §26; 2 Courtright Mills Anno. Stat. of Colo. (1935) c. 48 §§5,
6; Georgia Penal Code (1926) Art. 2, §§35, 36; Rev. Laws of Hawaii (1925) Ch.
217, §3914; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937) Ch. 38, par. 591, §14; Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923)
§§9913, 9915; Mont. Rev. Code (1921) §10729; N. Y. Pen. Law (1935) §1120; Nev.
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substance that all persons are capable of committing crimes except
-and there follows an enumeration usually embracing infants-and
then typically appear the words, "idiots, lunatics, and insane per-
sons." This would tend to show that the words mean different
things and that the term "insanity" should not be considered generic
when used in this sense. Further, it is interesting to note that
the usual method of raising the defense of idiocy is by the
same plea or method by which the defense of insanity is raised.23
Washington is a possible exception to this by statute, where mental
irresponsibility as well as insanity is a defense. By construction,
however, it would appear that the court has made them practically
interchangeable.' 4
A New York statute provides that a person is not to be excused
from crime as an idiot, imbecile, lunatic, or insane person unless
the proof shows that he did not know the nature and quality of his
act, or that he was doing wrong.2 5  Some other jurisdictions have
statutes somwhat similar.26 This savours of the rule in McNaghten's
case2' but it is the general interpretation that is applied to such
statutes by the courts where there are no such statutory defini-
tions.2 8  It is submitted that such interpretations are incorrect,
especially when they base the test of irresponsibility in mental
defect cases upon the test of insanity in general, when in turn that
test is based upon McNaghten's case. It must be remembered that
Comp. Laws (1929) §9952; Okla. Stats. Ann. (1937) §152; Philippine Rev. Pen. Code
(1933) Art. 12; Utah Rev. Stats. (1933) 103-1-20; 103-1-40; 4 Rem. Rev. Stat. of
Wash. (1932) §2173.
23 At least upon the plea of insanity, counsel have requested charges dealing
with mental defect. State v. Schilling, 95 N. J. Law 145, 112 AtI. 400 (1920);
Woodruff v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 51 S. W. (2d) 843 (1932); People v. Moran, 246
N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927); same, 249 N. Y. 179, 163 N. E. 553 (1928); Cryder v.
State, 101 Neb. 85, 161 N. W. 1045 (1917.); People v. Oxnam, 170 Cal. 211, 149 Pac. 165
(1915); Wartena v. State, 105 Ind. 445. 5 N. E. 20 (1886); Commonwealth v. Stewart,
255 Mass. 9, 151 N. E. 74, 44 A. L. R. 579, anno. p. 584 (1926); Commonwealth v.
Belenski, 276 Mass. 35, 176 N. E. 501 (1931).
24 4. Rem. Rev. Stat. of Wash. (1932) §2173; State v. Schafer, 156 Wash. 240,
286 Pac. 833 (1930), for the previous opinion in the case see State v. Schafer, 154
Wash. 322, 282 Pac. 55 (1929).
23N. Y. Penal Law (1935) §1120.
26 Rev. Laws of Hawaii (1925) Ch. 217, §§3914, 3915; Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923)
§9915; Okla. Stats. Ann. (1937) §152; Rev. Stat. of Utah (1933) 103-1-40.
27 10 Cl. & F. 200 (1843). This case is popularly supposed to have settled the
law of England -with reference to the legal test of insanity. For a critique of
the case see Glueck, S., Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law (1925) 161 et seq.
28 Christwell v. State, 171 Ark. 255, 283 S. W. 981 (1926); People v. Kimball,
55 P. (2d) 483 (Cal. 1936); People v. Norton, 138 Cal. App. 70, 31 P. (2d) 809 (1934);
People v. Oxnam, 170 Cal. 211, 149 Pac. 165 (1915); Studstill v. State, 7 Ga. 2, 12
(1849); Battle v. State, 105 Ga. 703, 32 S. E. 160 (1898); Rogers v. State, 128 Ga. 67,
57 S. E. 227 (1907); note 10 L. R. A. (N. s.) 999; Bridges v. State, 43 Ga. App. 214,
158 S. E. 358 (1931); State v. Schlaps, 78 Mont. 560, 254 Pac. 858 (1927).
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McNaghten was suffering from insane delusions, was a paranoiac,
and the entire decision in that case was based upon disease of the
mind and not feebleness of mind.
In Georgia is found a statute which provides that an idiot shall
not be found guilty or punished for any crime or misdemeanor
with which he may be charged. 29 In an early case the court re-
jected the evidence of a defendant's weak-mindedness on the ground
that it was admitted that such evidence would not show the de-
fendant to be an idiot, lunatic, or insane. The court thought that
to engraft an exception on the law would "lead to endless meta-
physical discussions on the philosophy of the mind."30  A later
Georgia case adopted the old definition of an idiot as one "who
hath no understanding from his nativity."3 1  The question in this
case arose on a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. Four persons deposed that the defendant was
"stupid, idiotic, and simple-minded." The court said that it was
not probable that the persons who made the affidavits in behalf of
the defendant intended to swear that he was an "idiot" in the
real sense of the term. The difficulty into which such constructions
and rulings may finally lead a court is aptly shown in a recent
Georgia case. In Bridges v. State,'2 where no facts are given in the
opinion, but which was a charge of unlawfully shooting at another
and the defense insanity, the court said: "If a man has reason suffi-
cient to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to a par-
ticular act about to be committed, he is criminally responsible....
The accused was convicted of unlawfully shooting at another. The
evidence amply authorized a finding that he was an idiot (and a
dangerous one at that); but under all the facts of the case as
disclosed by the record, this court cannot say that the jury were not
authorized to determine from certain parts of the evidence, and
the legal inferences arising therefrom, that the accused had reason
sufficient to know that the act he was about to commit . . . was
wrong; and, the finding of the jury having been approved by the
trial judge and no error of law upon the trial being complained of,
this court is without authority to interfere.133
29 Georgia Pen. Code Art. 2, §36 (1926).
30 StudstilL v. State, 7 Ga. 2, 12 (1849).
31 Battle v. State, 105 Ga. 703, 32 S. E. 160 (1898).
32 43 Ga. App. 214, 158 S. E. 358 (1931).
33 A Georgia Appellate Court was confronted with a case of assault with intent
to rape, and insanity was the defense. The court said: "Of course, I am not
including in this discussion idiots or lunatics; for the law of no civilized country
holds these unfortunates responsible for their acts, either civil or criminal. Our
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From these cases it is apparent that in Georgia there is a
distinction between mental defect and insanity. By statute idiocy is
a defense to crime, but when affiant swears that a defendant is
"stupid, idiotic, and simple-minded" it appears that the court need
not construe it to mean that he is legally an idiot. Further, it
appears that, despite the statute, the court may find that a person
is an idiot and still hold him responsible for his act. Just what the
court in Bridges v. State meant when it said that the defendant
was an idiot is not clear. From the early Georgia cases it appears
that one who can distinguish right from wrong is not to be classed
as an idiot, yet here it appears that the defendant was legally an
idiot, if the opinion of the court is correct, and yet they could not
say that he did not know right from wrong. Consequently the
conviction was affirmed. Factually and logically the case seems
to be anomalous. The defendant was either an idiot or not an
idiot. If the former, he was not guilty by statute. If the latter,
he could be guilty. But logically it is difficult to see how he could
be an idiot, as the court says he is, and still be guilty without a
complete disregard for the statute. It is to be regretted that more
of the facts were not given in the report of the case. If the de-
fendant were an idiot in the psychological sense, how could he
know right from wrong? Under the Georgia decisions, if he did
know right from wrong, he was not an idiot.
In some jurisdictions, as previously shown, it is provided by
statute that an imbecile shall not be held criminally responsible
for his acts, and it is quite usual for the statute to contain a pro-
vision to the effect that no one shall be excused from criminal
liability as an imbecile unless it appears that at the time of com-
mitting the act charged he did not know right from wrong, or
understand the nature and quality of his act, or both. Such a pro-
vision nullifies the use of the word "imbecile" and merely provides
for the usual "right and wrong" test of insanity to be applied. It is
submitted that the same result would be reached at common law
without the use of any such statute. California does not have such
a statute on imbecility; yet its courts consistently refuse to allow
the jury to consider testimony which tends to show that a de-
fendant is weak-minded unless it will show legal insanity, which
Penal Code expressly declares that an idiot shall not be found guilty or punishedfor any crime or misdemeanor with which, he may be charged .... ".Wilson
v. State, 9 Ga. App. 274, 70 S. E. 1128 (1911).
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in California is an inability to know right from wrong with respect
to the particular act committed.
3 4
Another situation presents itself in those states having statutes
making it rape for any male person over a specified age to have
illicit carnal knowledge of an idiot. The Iowa statute contains the
expression ". . . idiot or female naturally of such imbecility of
mind or weakness of body as to prevent effectual resistance .. ,"35
the courts take a much broader view of the terms "idiot" or "im-
becility of mind" in these cases than in those where it is interposed
by the defendant as a defense. The rape cases hold that the idiocy
of the prosecutrix to warrant a conviction is not idiocy in the
sense of a state of mental defect which is nearly absolute; that
"it is not necessary to constitute .... or even generally held that the
person should have been wholly destitute of mind from infancy or
totally deficient in intellectual powers;" that imbecility is scarcely
separable from idiocy and in many cases it is difficult to draw
a line between them with any degree of l recision .3 Where the
expression "imbecility of mind" was used with reference to a
female in defining statutory rape, the courts have said that they
are not confined to cases of complete or "absolute imbecility" but
include those who have some degree of understanding but who are
so far below normal in mental strength that they can offer no ef-
fectual resistance to the advances of those who would violate their
persons. Then usually the courts add that this will include those
"who by reason of mental inferiority are incapable of knowing
or realizing the moral quality of their act and are therefore incap-
able of giving rational consent."37 In a case where the prose-
cutrix was a girl of fourteen - thirteen being the statutory age
of consent - the court said that: "Her answers to questions
show that she is almost an imbecile, unless she was feigning im-
becility. .. The ... judge and the jury . . . saw and heard her
while she was on the witness stand . . .we think it is not proper
for this court to interfere with the verdict."3 8 The court mentioned
that the jury were undoubtedly influenced by the fact that she was
34People v. Kimball, 55 P. (2d) 483 (1936); People v. Norton, 138 Cal. App.
70, 31-P. (2d) 809 (1934); People v. Oxnam, 170 Cal. 211, 149 Pac. 165 (1915); People
v. Keyes, 178 Cal. 794, 175 Pac. 6 (1918); People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 273 Pac.
767 (1928).
35 State v. Enright, 90 Iowa 520, 58 N. W. 901 (1894); State v. Haner, 186 Iowa
1259, 173 N. W. 225 (1919). Cf. Sandefur v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 655, 137 S. W.
504 (1911).
36 Ibid. Jones v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 752, 159 S. W. 568 (1913).
37 State v. Haner, 186 Iowa 1259, 173 N. W. 225 (1919).
38 State v. Enright, 90 Iowa 520, 58 N. W. 901 (1894).
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a girl past the age of consent. In Jones v. Commonwealth39 in
Kentucky, where the facts were the same as in the preceding case,
it was urged that the trial court should have charged the jury on
the definition of an idiot as it was defined in the probate code relat-
ing to administration and custody of idiots. The court refused to
apply the probate statute in the criminal case, although it con-
tained the old common law definition of "one who has been destitute
of mind from infancy." The court relied upon the fact that the
criminal statute was passed with a different purpose in mind, i. e.,
the protection of idiotic females from lewd advances.40 Under the
statute in Kentucky, an idiotic female is one who is not necessarily
destitute of all understanding or totally deficient in intellectual
powers; but if she is sufficiently weak-minded so that she Is
"incapable of knowing right from wrong, or, if knowing it, have
not the power to resist the temptation" the jury should be so in-
structed, and such an instruction is correct.4 In connection with
this definition it should be noted that Kentucky follows the "insane
irresistible impulse" test of insanity; consequently the test of "idiocy"
is practically the same as that of insanity.42
Two other cases merit brief comment. In State v. Jewett43
there was no statute giving mentally defective women protection.
The prosecutrix, thirty-two years of age with a mental age of seven
years, consented to illicit intercourse with the defendant. She
became pregnant and he was charged with rape. On the trial
the prosecutrix testified that she knew that intercourse was wrong
and that she shouldn't have consented to it. The only question on
the I rial was whether or not she had the mental capacity to consent.
The Supreme Court of Vermont held that there was insufficient
evidence to take the case to the jury and a motion for a directed
verdict for the defendant should have been granted. In People v.
Boggs,4 the California court had before it a rape case in which the
prosecutrix was twenty-two years of age, with a mental age of
ten to twelve years. The same question of mental capacity of the
prosecutrix was raised in this case. Yet the court said that it could
not hold as a matter of law that the prosecutrix was capable of
3.) 154 Ky. 752, 159 S. W. 568 (1913).
40 Ibid.
41 Sandefur v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 655, 137 S. W. 504 (1911).
42Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 Duv. 224 (Ky. 1864); Howard v. Commonwealth,
224 Ky. 224, 5 S. W. (2d) 1056 (1928).
43 State v. Jewett, 192 Atl. 7 (Vt. 1937).
44 People v. Boggs, 107 Cal. App. 492, 290 Pac. 618 (1930) hearing denied by
the Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 28, 1930, note (1931) 22 J. Crim. L. & Crin. 116.
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giving consent and affirmed the conviction. The cases are inconsis-
tent in result upon similar factual bases. The fact that a statute was
involved in the California case does not influence the result, for
the statute is declaratory of the common law governing consent.4 5
In neither case was the prosecutrix an idiot or imbecile within ihe
psychological definition of the term.
There is another difficulty in the cases dealing with mental
defect. As pointed out, the defense is raised generally in the. same
manner as the defense of insanity. The general rule in the states
following the "insane irresistible impulse" test for insanity is that
such impulse must be the result of a diseased mind. Medically
there is a distinction between amentia or mental -defect, and de-
mentia or a diseased or injured condition causing unsoundness of.
mind; therefore, an expert cannot go on the witness stand and
testify that the defendant is suffering from a mental disease when
he is only mentally deficient. In some jurisdictions the courts have
held it not error to exclude testimony showing mental defect or
weak intellect of a defendant when such testimony "will not estab-
lish insanity"-that is the inability to know right from wrong (if
that is the test) with respect to the particular act committed. 4G Yet
in the rape cases the evidence of mental defect usually is ad-
mitted to show idiocy or imbecility. It is only logical and practical
that here a much more relaxed view of mental defect be taken. In
cases where it is the mental condition of the defendant that is being
inquired into, such evidence should go to the jury on the question
of idiocy, or "insanity" where that is the defense, for it would
appear that the ability to distinguish right from wrong is a fact
question for the jury.
With the development of intelligence tests, some modification
of the criminal law might have been expected concerning responsi-
bility of those of low mentality. There have been many advances
in intelligence testing since Galton devised what was probably the
first test about 1885. 7 Any number of tests have been used by
psychologists and they have been revised and modified to conform
45Cal. Pen. Code (1935) §261.
-0 Rogers v. State, 128 Ga. 67, 47 S. E. 227, note 10 L. R. A. (N. s.) 999 (1907);
Studstill v. State, 7 Ga. 2 (1849); State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt. 450, 108 Atl. 391 (1919).
Semble, State v. Schlaps, 78 Mont. 560, 254 Pac. 858 (1927); People v. Oxnam, 170
Cal 211, 149 Pac. 165 (1915).
47 For a discussion of the history of intelligence tests see, 12 Ency. Brittanica
(14th ed. 1929) 461; 10 Ency. of the Social Sciences (1933) 323. See also M.
Hamblin Smith, The Psychology of the Criminal (1922) ch. II.
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to different situations." While their use in the criminal law for the
purpose of determining the mental capacity of offenders has been
both praised and condemned,4' it would appear that the results
of intelligence tests, taken with some other corroborative evidence,
would tend to show the relative "intelligence" of the subject tested."
At least it would seem to be a better method of determining whether
a person were an idiot, imbecile, moron, or of "weak intellect"
than by common reputation in a c6mmunity, or the appearance
of the defendant on the witness stand in court where he is at the
disadvantage of cross-examination by a skilled interrogator. Yet
the courts have not given mental tests much consideration in the
trial of cases. In a recent case, where an alienist was on the
stand and had testified to the mental development of a defendant,
the appellate court said: "A jury of laymen are not likely to
attach much weight to the opinions of a psychoanalyst 5' with respect
to the degrees of mental development as affecting responsibility
for crime."' 2  Expressions such as the following are common:
"Low mentality is not, in law, insanity, and does not excuse one
who otherwise is able to distinguish between right and wrong. '5 3
"Imbecility is no defense against crime unless its existence deprives
the individual of the power to distinguish between right and
wrong."' 4 It is clear that the courts generally refuse to consider
low mentality as a mitigating factor in criminal cases. It must be
either a complete defense or .nothing.
There are a few notable exceptions to this view." In People
v. Moran,56 the New York Court of Appeals held that feebleness of
48 Healy, The Individual Delinquent (1920) Chap. VI, pp. 68-103; Terman, The
Measurement of Intelligence (1916) 51 et seq.
49 Ballantine, Criminal Responsibility of the Insane and Feeble-Minded (1919)
9 J. Crim. L. & Crim. 485; Wallin, Who Is Feeble-Minded (1916) 6 J. Crim. L. &
Crim. 706; Kohs, Who Is Feeble-Minded (1916) 6 J. Crim. L. & Crim. 860; Wallin,
Who Is Feeble-Minded, a Reply to Mr. Kohs (1916) 7 J. Crim. L. & Crim. 56.
5- Doll, On the Use of the Term "Feeble-Minded" (1918) 9 J. Crim. L. & Crim.
217. I have discussed at some length the use of "mental ages" as a test of criminal
responsibility in my paper, "Physical and Mental Infancy in the Criminal Law,"
87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 426 (1939).
51 The facts of the case do not show that the expert was a psychoanalyst.
" Woodruff v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 51 S. W. (2d) 843 (1932).
53 People v. Norton, 138 Cal. App. 70, 31 P. (2d) 809 (1934).
People v. Keyes, 178 Cal. 794, 175 Pac. 6 (1918).
r5 People v. Moran, 249 N. Y. 179, 163 N. E. 553 (1928); Demaree v. Common-
wealth, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 507, 82 S. W. 231 (1904); Mangrum v. Commonwealth, 19
Ky. L. Rep. 94, 39 S. W. 702 (1897); Farris v. Commonwealth, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 217,
1 S. W. 729 (1886); But compare People v. Koehn, 207 Cal. 605, 279 Pac. 646 (1929).
56 249 N. Y. 179, 163 N. E. 553 (1928), for the case on a previous hearing, 246
N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927). Contra: Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 257 Mass.
391, 153 N. E. 881 (1926).
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mind or will, even though not so extreme as to justify a finding
that the defendant was irresponsible under their statute, might be
considered by. the jury in determining whether there was sufficient
"deliberate and premeditated design" in the killing to ;nake it
murder in the first degree, or some lesser degree. It is submitted
that this court is taking the correct approach to the problem, al-
though it is decidedly in the minority.57  In the Moran case the
-defendant was a "psychopathic inferior" which condition appeared
to be complicated by low mentality, although how low does not
appear. "' In the cases which hold to the contrary appears the
spectre of stare decisis. At the time of Coke, Hale, and other early
writers on the criminal law, upon whom the courts like to rely
today, murder and manslaughter only were recognized in the hom-
icide cases. In the common law that situation still prevails. In
57 Christwell v. State, 171 Ark. 255, 283 S. W. 981 (1926); People v. Keyes, 178
Cal. 794, 175 Pac. 6 (1918); People v. Norton, 138 Cal. App. 70, 31 P. (2d) 809 (1934);
People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 273 Pac. 767 (1928); Bridges v. State, 43 Ga. App. 214,
158 S. E. 358 (1931); People v. Marquis, 344 IlM. 261, 176 N. E. 314, 74 A. L. R. 751
(1931); State v. Tapie, 173 La. 780, 138 So. 665 (1931); Commonwealth v. Devereaux,
257 Mass. 391, 153 N. E. 881 (1926); State v. Paulsgrove, 203 Mo. 193, 101 S. W. 27
(1907); Commonwealth v. Wireback, 190 Penn. 138, 42 Ati. 542 (1899); Woodruff
v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 51 S. W. (2d) 843 (1932); Rodgers v. State, 28 -S. W. 685
(Tex. Crim. App. 1894); Hogue v. State, 65 Tex. Crim. App. 539, 146 S. W. 905
(1912); State v. Schafer, 154 Wash. 322, 282 Pac. 55 (1929); same, 156 Wash. 240,
286 Pac. 833 (1930); anna. 44 A. L. R. 584 (1926).
58 The record of the case shows that the defendant refused to submit to
intelligence tests (pp. 493 and 601 of the record of the case on the second appeal).
One alienist testified that, so far as he could ascertain from the history of -the
defendant, he had a "rather pretty good degree of intelligence" (p. 669 of the
record). The same alienist had previously testified that he had administered
intelligence tests to the defendant but their results were not shown in the record
(p. 601 of the record). The charge of the court dealt, in part, with weak-
mindedness. The court charged, in part:
a weak or even disordered mind is not excused from the conse-
quences of crime" (p. 1083 of the record).
Concerning the weight of the evidence, the court said, in part:
"On this question of insanity the question is did he know the nature
and quality of the act and did he know that it was wrong. That is the
sole question as to insanity in this case, gentlemen. Did he know the
nature and quality of his act? That is the only kind of insanity that the
law recognizes. He may have been eccentric, or peculiar, or of a low
grade of mentality, or suffering from epilepsy or a psychopathic person-
ality. That would not and does not excuse him unless it produced such
a defect of mind as to render him incapable of understanding the nature
and the quality of his act and that it was wrong . . ." (p. 1088 of the
rdcord).
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals mentioned that the defendant was "a man
of law and unstable mentality," as well as a psychopathic personality, and prob-
ably a sufferer from epilepsy. The record shows that he completed the eighth
grade in grammar school at the age of fourteen or fifteen years. He did not
attend school after that time. *(Record, pp. 169, 170, 410.) It may be doubted
whether the decision in the case necessitated a consideration of feeble-mindedness.
People'v. Moran, 249 N. Y. 179, 180, 163 N. E. 553 (1928).
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many of our jurisdictions today there are, however, by statute,
several degrees of homicide. It would seem that the very purpose
of providing for degrees of homicide would be to mitigate, in cer-
tain cases, the former rigours of the common law. Yet these same
courts in states which do recognize degrees of homicide still hold
that mental defect must be either a complete defense or nothing
and often cite the old authorities in support of their holding. This
would appear a too close adherence to precedents which, in the
light of subsequent developments in both law and psychology,
should no longer apply. Further, it would seem, that when "heat
of blood" and drunkenness may go to the jury to determine whether
a defendant "premeditated or deliberated" over his crime, the
question of the relative "intelligence" bearing upon the mental
capacity of the defendant should be material in determining the
same thing. Certainly "stupefaction by nature," for which the
defendant is not responsible, should be as important as voluntary
drunkenness in the determination of the degree of offense com-
mitted. It is a matter of common knowledge that a person of weak
mind may be more susceptible to impetuosity, to lack of remem-
brance, and to inability to weigh facts, than is one of normal mind.
It is difficult to understand, apart from the doctrine of stare decisis,
why mental defect should not be submitted to the jury along with
the other evidence as bearing upon the mental element required,
at least in homicide cases.
II. Deafness and Dumbness as Idiocy
As has been mentioned, idiocy has from the earliest times been
a complete defense to crime. Total ignorance and lack of under-
standing from birth were indications of idiocy.' 9 The social implica-
tion seems to have been that one who was unable to care for himself
could not manage his own property and was not criminally re-
sponsible for his acts."' Hence it was only logical to suppose that
51 Dalton, The Country Justice (1643) Cap. 95; 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown
(ed. 1736) 29, 30; Coke's Littleton 247a; Brydall, Non Compos Mentis or the Law
Relating to Natural Fools, Mad Folks and Lunaticke Persons (1700) 6.
GO Fitzherbert, The New Natura Brevium (ed. 1652) 581, 583. "And he who
shall be said to be a Sot and Idiot from his birth, is such a person, who cannot
accompt or number twenty pence, nor can tell who was his Father, or Mother,
nor know how old he is, etc., so as it may appear, that he hath no understanding
or reason what shall be for his profit, or what for his losse: But if he have such
understanding, that he know and understand his letters, and to read by teaching
or information of another man, then it seemeth he is not a Sot nor a naturall
Idiot." Note that here Fitzherbert was not considering the criminal law, but
rather the Writ de Idiota Inquirendo. 1 Blackstone's Comm. 303 (1765); cf. In re
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anyone who could not be taught to do things for himself, and to
converse with others, should be included in this category. Thus the
common law considered that one who was deaf or dumb from
birth was in the same position as an idiot."' The reason given was
that he could not be taught to understand others, and they could
not understand him. He would "have no understanding from
nativitate," and would fit in well with the mediaeval meaning of a
'foole naturall. ' ' C2 If he were dumb only, and killed another, it was
felony in him. The question of how he would be arraigned was
troublesome, however.13  Also, if a man were not born deaf and
dumb, bu.t became so after his birth, he could be held criminally
responsible for his acts. Probably the reason for this was that
he could have learned to distinguish good from evil by hearing
others and speaking to them before he became deaf or dumb.64
The exact origin of the rule of criminal irresponsibility of
natural born deaf-mute seems to be uncertain. The late Mr. Justice
Holmes said that it arose from Roman law where, because of the
extreme formal requirements of the question and answer, a deaf
and dumb person could not enter into the stipulatio, the early
Roman contract. 5  It appears in the early Anglo-Saxon law at
least as far back as the ninth century. In the laws of Alfred is a
provision that, "If anyone is born dumb or deaf, so that he can
neither deny nor confess his wrongdoings, his father shall pay
compensation for his misdeeds."0 01 This at least indicated that the
responsibility of a deaf or dumb person at this time stopped short
Lindsley, 44 N. J. Eq. 564, 15 Atl. 1 (1888). Obviously "intelligence" and criminal
capacity are not synonymous, but a measure of the intelligence of a defendant
should be a factor to aicA the trier of fact in determining whether the defendant
had capacity to formulate or entertain the intent required in the particular act
with which he is charged.
01 Pulton, Pace Regis e Regni (1609) f. 126; Lambard, Eirenarcha (1619) 23.2;
Dalton, The Country Justice (1643) 299; 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown (folio ed.
1736) 34; 1 Blackstone's Comm. 304 (1765).
02 Brydall, Non Compos Mentis, or the Law Relating to Natural Fools, Mad-
Folks, and Lunatick Persons (1700) 6, 7; Beverley's Case (1603) 4 Coke 124.
03 Dalton, The Country Justice (6th ed. 1643) 299.
64 "A man borne deafe and dumbe, killeth another, that is no felony; for
he cannot know whether he did evill or no; neither can he have a felonious in-
tent, . . . Otherwise if he were not so borne, but becometh so afterwards. See
Br. Coro. 101 & 217. That a man which can neither heare nor speake may com-
mit felony, and shall be imprisoned, &c." Ibid.
65 Leage, Roman Private Law (1906) 272; Holmes, Law in Science and Science
in Law (1899) 12 Harv. L. Rev. 443; same, Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (1920)
210. But cf.'5 Bracton, De Legibus f. 375-7. Gaw, Legal Status of the Deaf 10-41
(1907) traces the development of the legal capacity of deaf-mutes in Roman
Law.
0 Laws of Alfred 14, Attenborough. Laws of the Earliest English Kings (1922)
71.
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with the payment of compensation. It seemed at that time that if
a wrongdoer were deaf or dumb, he should not be charged with
crime, but his father would be held to pay the "bot" which was
assessable according to the deed. This view of absolute non-
liability seemed to prevail at least until 1609. Writing in that
year, Pulton said that a man who "is franticke though he kill an-
other man, cannot commit murder, for he hath not a felonious
intent, nor doth carrie within him malice prepenced to any, neyther
doth know what he doth. And therefore he is not to be arraigned
for the killing of a man in his lunacie . . . neither shall he be
inforced to sue for his pardon. And the same law is of a man that is
deafe and dumbe, who cannot commit murder, for he hath not a
felonious intent, neither doth he know what he doth. And therefore
if he kill a man he shall not be arraigned thereof, nor driven to
sue for his pardon." 7 Thus, at this time, the fact of deafness or
dumbness was an absolute defense to crime, and not merely a
ground for pardon. This view was undoubtedly influenced by the
development of the rule, prior to this time, that insanity was a
defense to crime, and not merely a ground for pardon after the
conviction of the insane person.
Lambard, writing in 1619, however, thought that deafness and
dumbness would create only a presumption that such person had no
mind or will to "doe the harme" unless it may "by some evident
token app'eare, that he had understanding of good and evill: for
then, in him Malitia supplebit aetatem. ' '68 This view seemed to
prevail in the law and the rule came to be well established in
England that in these cases there was a presumption of incapacity
of the defendant to entertain the requisite intent as an element in
a criminal act. Later, Sir Matthew Hale, with his usual perspicacity,
stated the rule much as Lambard had done about seventy-five years
before, but added that such a person would be guilty if he "hath the
use of understanding, which many of that condition discover by
signs to a very great measure ...... " He said that while such a
person could be made to suffer judgment and execution, great
caution should be used in their trials.
Such views naturally gave rise to other problems in the criminal
law. After the trial by ordeal had been abolished and that of
inquest by jury substituted, the extreme ritualism of- the early
7 Pulton, Pace Regis e Regni (1609) f. 126.
68Lambard, Eirenarcha (1619) 232.
691 Hale, Pleas of the Crown (folio ed. 1736) 34.
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law required that a formal plea be entered by the defendant, and
in answer to the question, "Culprit, how will you be tried," the
answer had to be "By God and my Country.' '70 Now it was obvious
that a deaf-mute could not plead and make answer to such ques-
tions, and the courts could not proceed without such a plea, for
it appeared to them hardly proper to try a defendant before a jury
when he had not requested it. They could not convict and execute
him without an inquest, hence arose the custom of impaneling a
jury to determine whether the defendant stood mute "of malice
or by visitation of God." If he stood mute of malice, he was
subjected to the terrible peine forte et dure which is.so graphically
depicted by Stephen.7 1  Many who were guilty and would be
executed, would stand mute so that they would be killed by the
peine forte et dure without a conviction in order that there would
not be a forfeiture of their goods, and consequently that their heirs
could inherit.7 2 By way of digression it might be pointed out that
the peine forte et dure was abolished in 1772 when it was provided
by statute that one standing mute of malice should be considered
guilty.73 This was made to apply also to "his Majesty's colonies
and plantations in America." In 1827 another statute provided that
in such cases the court should enter a plea of not guilty and the
trial should proceed.74 If the jury found, on the preliminary in-
quest, that the defendant stood mute "by visitation of God" the
jury then would be sworn to determine whether he had sufficient
understanding to comprehend the nature of the trial. If the de-
fendant had such understanding, and could be communicated with,
the trial proceeded. Several interesting cases illustrate this pro-
cedure.
In King v. Jones75 in 1773, the defendant, a deaf-mute, was
indicted for stealing five guineas. The jury found that he stood
mute by "visitation of God." But it appeared that he could com-
70 1 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883) 297 et seq.
7'1 If a person refused to plead to an indictment, a jury was impaneled to
determine whether he stood mute by malice or by visitation of God. If the
former, he was taken to have pleaded guilty and dealt with accordingly. "If
he was accused of felony, he was condemned after much exhortation, to the
peine forte et dure, that is, to be stretched naked on his back, and to have 'iron
laid upon him as much as he could bear and more,' and so to continue fed upon*
bad bread and stagnant water on alternate days, till he either pleaded or
died . . . ." 1 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 70 at 299.
72 2 Pike, History of Crime in England (1873) 387.
73 12 Geo. 3, c. 20 (1772).
74 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 28, §2.
75 1 Leach C. C. 102 (1773).
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municate his ideas to a witness, and be communicated with; con-
sequently he was placed upon trial, convicted of simple larceny,
and sentenced to be transported. In John Ruston's case7 0 in 1786,
Ruston, a man mutus et surdus a nativitate, was a crown witness.
When it appeared that he could communicate with his sister by
signs, he was held a competent witness. The leading case on the
point, however, is The King v. Steel.7 The defendant was charged
with simple larceny, refused to plead, and was found to stand mute
by "visitation of God." She complained that she could not hear
and refused to plead on a second arraignment. The court, after
saying that such cases should be tried with "great diligence and
circumspection" and every right of the defendant protected, ordered
the trial to proceed. The defendant was convicted of simple larceny
and sentenced to transportation for seven years.
Since 1800, however, the results of the cases appear to have
changed and it was very seldom that such a person was tried.
The reason for this seems to have been the statutory provision
made in 1800 for the care of mentally disordered persons charged
with crime. It will be remembered that in Hadfield's Case (1800)7'
the defendant had shot at King George III in the Royal Theatre
in Drury Lane and was charged with high treason. It was obvious
on the trial that he was insane due to severe injuries suffered in
the wars. The defendant's lawyer, Sir Thomas Erskine, did not
want him acquitted and sent back into the community but there
was no provision made for the incarceration of insane persons
who were charged with crime or acquitted of criminal responsibility
because of insanity. As a result of that case, a statute was passed
which provided for the safe custody of such persons.-
The cases of deaf-mutes who were charged with crime and
stood mute on arraignment, being found mute by "visitation of
God" and then being tried, show that after 1800 very few of them
ever went to trial on the merits, rather the jury found that they
were incapable of communicating to others or of being commun-
icated with, or of unsound mind, and they were ordered, under
the statute, to be "detained until his Majesty's pleasure be known."' 0
701 Leach C. C. 408 (1786).
771 Leach C. C. 451 (1787).
,s 27 How. St. Trials 1282 (1800).
70 40 Geo. 3 Ch. 93, 94 (1800) amended by Trial of Lunatics Act, 47 & 48 Vict.
c. 64 (1884).
so For example see Rex v. Tyson, 7 Car & P. 305 (1831); Rex v. Pritchard, 7
Car. & P. 303 (1836). But see Rex v. Thompson, 2 Lewin C. C. 137 (1827) where
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Undoubtedly the progress of education of the deaf and dumb
has had some influence upon this phase of the law. The first at-
tempt at education of the deaf was in 700 A. D. but it was not
until the sixteenth century that any serious .attempt was made.
A Spanish monk taught the deaf to speak during the sixteenth
century."' A book was published by another monk in 1620 dealing
with the subject. In England the first efforts were made in "1648
by Dr. John Bulwer. In 1760 a school for the deaf was opened in
Edinburgh by Thomas Braidwood. He moved his school to London
in 1783, and in 1792 the London Asylum for the Deaf and Dumb
was founded. This was the first English Institution for the deaf
and dumb. It is interesting to note that in Rex v. Pritchard (1836) 1 "
the court mentioned that the defendant, who was deaf and dumb,
had been educated in the Deaf and Dumb Asylum in London.
While there was some attempted education of deaf-mutes in this
country at the end of the seventeenth century, the first school was
opened in 1817.83
It appears to be generally recognized in the United States that
persons deaf, dumb, and blind may be educated and may possess
as much or more intelligence than the average, and it would seem
that the law should reject the old dogma that a person deaf or
dumb from birth be considered an idiot, or at least that there
should be a presumption to that effect. The courts are not in
accord in their views upon the subject, however, although most
of the cases have been decided since the education of the deaf and
dumb has been a matter of common public knowledge. Brower v.
Fishere4 was a civil suit regarding the capacity of the defendant
to make a deed. It appeared that he was deaf and dumb. A com-
mission to determine his sanity was appointed, and it was found
that he was sane unless the fact of deafness and dumbness were
a deciding factor. The court held that it was not, and dismissed
the bill, but held that the bill was not filed vexatiously, and did
not award costs. Later, in a suit in equity to set aside a deed on
the ground of incapacity of the grantor because she was deaf and
dumb, the North Carolina court 85 refused to follow the common
law rule and said that the capacity of a deaf-mute was to be
it appeared that the deaf and dumb defendant could read and write. He was
tried and acquitted.
81 7 Ency. Brittanica (14th ed. 1929) 101.
82 7 Car. & P. 303 (1836).
83 Supra note 81; 5 Ency. of the Social Sciences (1931) 18 et seq.
844 Johns Ch. 441 (N. Y. 1820).
85 Barnett et al v. Barnett et al, 1 Jones Eq. 221 (N. C. 1854).
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measured by what he has, and not by what he has not. The court
took judicial notice of the methods of educating such persons, and
said that their legal ability to make a contract is placed on its proper
ground-their mental capacity. Later, in Delaware, 6 the court,
in a murder case, applied the common law rule that there was a
presumption that a deaf and dumb person was incapable of com-
mitting a crime and the burden was on the state to show capacity.
The court in this case was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that
the defendant was a poor, uneducated negro who had been deaf
and dumb from birth. The jury, however, found him not guilty
by reason of insanity, or want of criminal responsibility. Two of
the latest cases on this point are particularly interesting. In State
v. Howard87 the Missouri court was faced with the question whether
two deaf-mutes were competent witnesses for the state in a murder
trial. The defendant 8bjected to their competency on the ground
that they were presumed to be idiots. The court said that the
presumption that a person deaf and dumb from birth should be
deemed an idiot does not seem to obtain in modern practice-
at least in the United States-and if it did, the circumstances
of the present case forbade its application. Historically, the court
is incorrect in its statement so far as the common law is concerned,
and there had been previous cases on the point in the United States
applying the common law rule. In 1915 the Kentucky court in
Belcher v. Commonwealth.1 had to decide whether a defendant
who had become deaf and dumb at the age of four years because of
fever, could be held responsible for homicide. The defendant in-
sisted that as he was a deaf-mute the trial court should hold him
incapable of committing the crime with which he was charged.
This the trial court refused to do, and charged generally upon the
question of the mental capacity of the defendant to know right
from wrong and the ability to control his actions. The Court of
Appeals of Kentucky very candidly said, with reference to the pre-
sumed incapacity of a deaf-mute at common law: "We are not
aware that such a doctrine has ever been announced by the
courts. The fact that the defendant is a deaf-mute is simply a
circumstance to be considered in connection with the other evi-
dence in determining whether or not he was mentally capable of
committing the crime. On this phase of the case the evidence was
s8 State v. Draper, 1 Houston Crim. Cas. 531 (Del. 1868).
97 118 Mo. 127, 24 S. W. 41 (1893).
8 165 Ky. 659, 177 S. W. 455, note, Ann. Cas. 1917 B. 240 (1915).
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conflicting and the question was one peculiarly for the jury." While
the court was incorrect with reference to the existence of the doc-
trine, it is submitted that it reached the most desirable conclusion
of any case considered. It is a matter of common knowledge that
deafness or dumbness, or deafness and dumbness is no insilr-
mountable barrier to learning, nor does it per se show a mental
incapacity to entertain an intent.. The life of Helen Keller is an
outstanding example of the ability to overcome even greater hand-
icaps;"" yet the early authorities on the criminal law would have
presumed that she had no mental capacity whatever.
The new Italian Penal Code has provided specifically for this
phase of the law. It provides that a deaf and dumV person, who,
at the moment he committed the act had not the capacity of in-
tention or volition, by reason of his infirmity, should not be charged
with the crime. And if the capacity of intention or volition is
largely diminished but not excluded, the punishment should be
reduced.9 0 In Germany it was originally provided that a deaf
and dumb person would be found not guilty if he did not possess
insight necessary for the comprehension of.the punishability of an
act committed by him.91 This was changed in 1933 when the- statute
was amended to provide that a deaf-mute would not be punished
for a deed if he were backward, or retarded in his mental develop-
ment and therefore not 'in a position to have insight into the for-
biddenness of the deed, or to act according to his insight. 2 This
would seem to indicate that if a deaf-mute had sufficient intelligence
to know that his act was forbidden by law he would be punished.
However, if for any reason he could not act according to his insight,
he would not be punishable. This would seem to reach the same
result as the Italian Penal Code with the exception of partial
responsibility. Of all the law considered, the provisions of the
Italian Code appear to be the most humane.
We are told that the justification of a law cannot be found in
the fact that our fathers have followed it, but must be found in
the social end which the law subserves.93 Some laws are mere
89 See her latest book, Helen Keller's Journal, Doubleday Doran & Company
(1938).
90 Italian Penal Code (1931) Title IV, Ch. I, Art. 96.
91 Strafgesetzbuch §58. I am indebted to Dr. Anton Chroust, Research Fellow,
Harvard Law School 1937-38, for the translation of the various sections of the
German Code which are cited in this and the following footnotes.
92Reichgesetzblatt, 1 P. 995 (November 24, 1933).
93 Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law (1899) 12 Harv. L. Rev. 443;
Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (1920) 210.
survivals. History alone shows their origin. The law here con-
sidered, as has been previously mentioned, probably arose in the
Roman law at a time of strict formalism whence came the rule that if
a person were either deaf or dumb, he was incapable of making a
contract.9  This was possibly carried by analogy into the Anglo
Saxon laws which provide that if a person were either deaf or dumb
he was not responsible, beyond the payment of compensation by his
father, for the consequences of wrongful acts. 5 The courts now
use the expression deaf and dumb without a consideration of the
two-fold requirement they are exacting, and without reference
to modern conditions. The unsoundness of the rule is further ap-
parent in England, which still recognizes it. In 1893 Parliament
passed the Elementary Education (Blind and Deaf Children) Act 6
providing for the compulsory attendance of deaf children between
the ages of seven and sixteen years at suitable schools to be pro-
vided by the local authorities. Curiously enough the second sec-
tion of this act provides that it shall not be the duty of a school
authority to provide such schools to children who are idiots or
imbeciles, among others. Yet the criminal courts of England still
continue to indulge in the presumption that deaf and dumb persons
are idiots.97
In this country, as already shown, the courts are divided. Those
which consider the historical setting of the rule refuse to follow
it, as do the courts which operate in ignorance of the rule. Those
which pay lip service, through the doctrine of stare decisis, to the
old cases, without viewing them in their historic setting, seem to
prefer the ancient rule.
III. Somnambulism and Somnolentia
Somnambulism has been defined as: "A sleep or sleeplike state
in which walking and other acts are performed. These acts are,
typically, not remembered in the subsequent waking state, but
may be recalled in a later attack; also the actions characteristic of
this state."98
94 Supra note 65.
95 Supra note 66.
9656 & 57 Vict. Chap 42 (1893).
97 "A person deaf and dumb from birth is by presumption of law an idiot,
but it may be shown that he has the use of his understanding." Harris & Wil-
shere, Criminal Law (16th ed. 1936) 32; Archbold's Criminal Pleading, Evidence
& Practice (28th ed. 1931) 14; Rex v. Gov. of His Majesty's Prison at Stafford, Ex.
Parte Emery 119091 2 K. B. 81, 16 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 442, note 444.
98 Webster's New International Dictionary (2nd ed. 1934) 2397.
FREDERICK WOODBRIDGE1 842
MENTAL IRRESPONSIBILITY 843
Somnolentia apparently means sleepyness, drowsiness, inclined
to sleep or marked by or inducing drowsiness.0 It would seem to be
that state wherein sleep overlaps into wakefulness, the period of
time when one is "apparently awake but still asleep." In Germany
this state is referred to by commentators as Schlaftrunkenheif or
sleep-drunkenness1 0 It should be distinguished from somnambu-
lism which is essentially sleep-walking or performing other acts in
bne's sleep. Somnolentia covers the period between apparent
waking-up and the time when the senses are actually awake. The
courts and counsel in these cases seem to have lost sight of the
fact that a somnambulist may not suffer from somnolentia, nor
necessarily does one suffering from somnolentia have to be a som-
nambulist or sleep-walker. A normal person may, from fatigue,
intoxication, or constitutional make-up, be difficult to awaken, hence
may suffer from somnolentia without ever having walked in his
sleep. Cases involving true somnambulism are very rare; cases
involving somnolentia appear only occasionally.
The courts and some commentators are not consistent in their
use of these terms, apparently using them interchangeably. For
instance, the court said in Fain v. Commonwealth,"'0 where the
defendant, while being awakened shot and killed the deceased,
that modern writers on medical-legal subjects treated a species of
mental unsoundness connected with sleep under the general head
of somnambulism. The court later mentioned somnolentia and
somnambulism and recognized the distinction between the two
terms,without applying either term specifically to the case. Al-
though this case has been cited as authority for somnambulism
as an excuse for crime,'0 2 it clearly is a case of somnolentia. The
result in each type of case should be the same, that is acquittal if
the defense is made out properly, but there might be a difference
in theory upon which the defense could be based. For instance,
in the true somnambulist cases, i.e., sleep-walking, it is clear that
there would be no criminal intent and the defendant not guilty.
10 3
In the somnolentia cases, the defendant could predicate his defense
upon either: 1. mental unconsciousness at the time of the act,
similar to insanity, and thus show the inability to form the requisite
99 Ibid.
10 Wharton & Stille, Medical Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1882) p. 393. Many inter-
esting cases are cited at this point.
10, 78 Ky. 183, 39 Am. Rep. 213 (1879).
102 Smoot, Law of Insanity (1929) §105.
103 Supra note 101.
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criminal intent, or 2. a mistake of fact, which was suggested in
the Fain case by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.'"°  Of course
it must be remembered that a mistake or ignorance of fact exempts a
person from criminal liability only when the act done would be
lawful if the facts were as the accused believed them to be and
as a reasonable person under the same circumstances would have
believed. 105 It is difficult to see how, "under the circumstances of
somnolentia," any person could act other than "reasonably" under
such conditions. Hence it does appear that a mistake or ignorance
of fact should be a good defense in such cases.10
While many cases of somnambulism are referred to in works
on medical jurisprudence, 1 7 only one case has been found officially
reported that clearly came under that specific head. That is the case
of H. M. Advocate v. Fraser from Scotland.10 8 In this case, the
defendant was a confirmed somnambulist. He had been known to
arise from his bed and, while asleep, go about his farm and do
chores, 'uch as cutting wood. On the night of the murder he went
to bed as usual. His wife and child were sleeping in the same
'4 Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 39 Am. Rep. 213. In a similar case in
Texas the court did charge upon mistaken identity, which would be equivalent
to a mistake of fact, but refused to charge upon somnambulism, The court .of
criminal appeal reversed the conviction for the failure to charge upon somnam-
bulism. This case indicates the two-fold nature of the defense that -may be
available in the somnolentia cases as distinguished from the cases of true somnam-
bulism. Bradley v. State, 277 S. W. 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925); for the final word
in the Bradley case see Bradley v. State, 295 S. W. 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 1927);
cf. Levet's case, Cro. Car. 538, 1 Hale, 42, 474; Wharton & Stille, Medical Jurispru-
dence (4th ed. 1882) 394 et seq.; Ray, Medical Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1860) Chap.
XXIV.
105 Miller, Criminal Law (1934) p. 156; Levet's Case, Cro. Car. 538, 1 Hale,
Pleas of the Crown, 42 474 (1778); semble, Bradley v. State, 277 S. W. 147 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1925).
106 "With regard to knowledge of fact, the law, perhaps, is not quite so clear,
but it may, I think, be maintained that in every case knowledge of fact is to
some extent an element of criminality as much as competent age and sanity.
To take an extreme illustration, can anyone doubt that a man who, though he
might be perfecctly( sane, committed what would otherwise be a crime in a state
of somnambulism, would be entitled to be acquitted? And why is this? Simply
because he would not know what he was doing. A multitude of illustrations
of the same sort might be given. I will mention one or two glaring ones. Levet's
case (1 Hale, 474) decides that a man who, making a thrust with a sword at a
place where, upon reasonable grounds, he supposed a burglar to be, killed a
person who was not a burglar, was held not to be a felon, though he might be
(it was not decided that he was) guilty of killing per infortunium, or possibly,
se defendo, which then involved certain forfeitures. In other words, he was
in the same situation as far as regarded the homicide as if he had killed a bur-
glar." Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 168, 187 (1889); see also Meredith, Insanity
as a Criminal Defense (1931) 95.
107 Wharton & Stille, op. cit. supra note 104; Ray, op. cit. supra note 104.
108 (1878) 4 Coup. 70; mentioned in Meredith, Insanity as a Criminal Defense
(1931) pp. 93-5; 1 Wharton & Stille's Medical Jurisprudence (5th ed. 1905) p. 903.
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room. The defendant began to suffer from nightmares during the
night and thought he was struggling with a wild beast which was
coming in to kill his child. He picked the child up and dashed
its head against the wall. His wife could not prevent it. When he
awakened he was distraught over what he had done. He 'vas
acquitted of the murder charge on the ground that "he was guilty
in his sleep" but "not guilty in his senses." Thus the court avoided
the troublesome question whether, legally, somnambulism and som-
nolentia cases should be considered in the same category as insanity
cases.
The few American cases on the subject seem to indicate, either
by inference, as in the Fain case, or directly, as in the later case of
Tibbs v. Commonwealth,09 that they should be considered as
equivalent to insanity cases. The latter case embraced approximately
the same factual situation as the Fain case. Somnambulism was
relied upon as a defense, and the court instructed the jury on in-
sanity. The defendant complained of this instruction but the court
said that, "We fail to see how these facts would constitute any
defense other than that embraced in a plea of insanity. Certainly
the appellant cannot complain that he was given the benefit of
such defense."110 Dictum in one other case is to the same effect. 1 '
In view of the scarcity of cases on this point it is submitted that
this dictum is unsound, when one considers the effect of the verdict
of "not guilty by reason of insanity." 2 Many states, when such a
verdict is returned, require that the defendant be committed to
an hospital for the criminally insane, there to be held either for a
definite length of time. before habeas corpus proceedings may be
had, or until such time as he is "restored to sanity." The courts
evidently did not have this consequence in mind when considering
these cases. With reference to a similar case in England, an English
commentator remarked: "The case ought not, we suggest, to be
cited in support of a general proposition that somnambulists are
insane. Sleepwalking denotes some abnormality of the nervous
system no doubt; but we have all known somnambulists whom we
should certainly have regarded as quite sane.""' 3 Dr. Wharton
thinks that this is a type of insanity and that the patient should
be committed to an insane hospital. He thinks that the only dif--
209 138 Ky. 558, 128 S. W. 871, 28 L. R. A. (x. s.) 665 (1910).
11o Ibid.
111 Bradley v. State, 277 S. W. 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925).
'112Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in the Criminal Law (1933) 266 et seq.
113 Editorial, Somnambulism and Crime, 93 Just. of Peace 765 (1929).
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ference between this and the other forms of paroxysmal insanity
is that this occurs while the patient is asleep.'14 It will be noted
that the court in Fraser's case avoided deciding the point. It
would appear, therefore, that the question is an open one in Scot-
land and England; that the courts in this country seem to favor
considering it as a form of insanity, but without a mention of the
attendant consequences of a verdict of acquittal by reason of
insanity.
In California it appears that the situation is covered by a
statute obviating the difficulty that some of the other courts in this
country will some day experience in deciding the question. In 1872
California adopted, as part of its Penal Code, a provision that:
"All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belong-
ing to the following classes: . .. 5. Persons who committed the
act charged without being conscious thereof.l'1 17 Subsections 2 and 3
of this section of the code mention idiots, lunatics, and insane per-
sons. Hence, it is obvious that subsection 5 was intended to provide
for a different situation. In dictum the California court has said
that this section does not contemplate "persons of unsound" but
comprehends only "cases of sound mind such as those involving
somnambulism or persons suffering with delirium from fever or
drugs.","; Thus this paradoxical situation has developed in this
phase of the criminal law. In California, and possibly in England,
a somnambulist, who commits a crime while in a somnambulistic
state may be considered legally sane and acquitted. In Kentucky
and Texas, under exactly the same circumstances, such a defendant
would be acquitted but would undoubtedly be considered legally
insane. Texas has no statutory provision for the detention of a
defendant acquitted on the ground of insanity. In Kentucky it
would appear that when such a verdict is returned, the court may,
if satisfied, after hearing evidence, that he is insane, order him
confined to the state hospital. "I
SUMMARY
From the foregoing it appears that mental defectives, idiots,
imbeciles and morons are, before the criminal law, considered
114 Wharton & Stille, Medical Jurisprudence (5th ed. 1905) p. 904.
115 California Penal Code §26; enacted February 14, 1872, effective January 1,
1873; Cal. Penal Code Annotated (1935) §26.
1' People v. Methever, 132 Cal. 326, 64 Pac. 481 (1901); People v. Rothrock,
68 P. (2d) 364 (Cal. App. 1937).
11 Kentucky Crim. Code §268 (Carroll, 1927).
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on the same plane as normal persons and their criminal respons-
ibility with reference to their defect is based upon the prevailing
legal test of insanity in the respective jurisdictions.
Deaf-mutes under the criminal law in England are still influ-
enced by the presumption that such a person is presumed to 'be
an idiot, but the English Parliament, through its Elementary Edu-
cation Act, has recognized that deaf and dumb persons are not
idiots. On the continent of Europe the fact of deafness or dumb-
ness is one of the factors to consider in determining whether to
charge a person with crime, or in determining his penal treatment.
In this country, due to our federal organization, some jurisdictions
follow the common law rule, some operate in ignorance of it and
merely allow the evidence of deaf-mutism to be considered by
the trier of fact as one fact bearing upon criminal capacity; and
some jurisdictions have expressly repudiated it.
In the somnambulism cases the English courts have decided
merely that somnambulism is a defense to a criminal act. Some
of the courts in this country have failed to consider the distinction
between somnambulism and somnolentia and have grouped such
cases with the insanity cases, without considering, evidently, the
ultimate consequences such a grouping might have. Dictum in a
California case suggests that the situation is covered in that state
by a statute, hence the consequences of finding a somnambulist
or one suffering from somnolentia 'not guilty by reason of in-
sanity" will not arise there.
